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Abstract—Malware lineage studies the evolutionary relation-
ships among malware and has important applications for mal-
ware analysis. A persistent limitation of prior malware lineage
approaches is to consider every input sample a separate malware
version. This is problematic since a majority of malware are
packed and the packing process produces many polymorphic
variants (i.e., executables with different file hash) of the same
malware version. Thus, many samples correspond to the same
malware version and it is challenging to identify distinct malware
versions from polymorphic variants. This problem does not
manifest in prior malware lineage approaches because they work
on synthetic malware, malware that are not packed, or packed
malware for which unpackers are available.
In this work, we propose a novel malware lineage approach
that works on malware samples collected in the wild. Given a
set of malware executables from the same family, for which no
source code is available and which may be packed, our approach
produces a lineage graph where nodes are versions of the family
and edges describe the relationships between versions. To enable
our malware lineage approach, we propose the first technique
to identify the versions of a malware family and a scalable code
indexing technique for determining shared functions between any
pair of input samples. We have evaluated the accuracy of our
approach on 13 open-source programs and have applied it to
produce lineage graphs for 10 popular malware families. Our
malware lineage graphs achieve on average a 26 times reduction
from number of input samples to number of versions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware lineage studies the evolutionary relationships
among malware, which has important security applications in
the context of malware analysis. For example, lineage can be
a fundamental step for triage, labeling, categorization, threat
intelligence, provenance, and authorship attribution. The goal
of malware lineage is to produce a lineage graph where nodes
are versions of the family and edges describe the ancestor-
descendant relationships between versions.
Similar to benign programs, malware families evolve to
adapt to changing requirements by adding new functionality,
and to improve stability by fixing bugs. However, malware
development typically comprises of an extra step not present
in benign software development. Once a new version of a mal-
ware family is ready, the malware authors pack the resulting
executable to hide its functionality and thus bypass detection
by commercial malware detectors. The packing process takes
as input an executable and produces another executable with
the same functionality. The packing process is typically applied
many times to the same input executable, creating polymorphic
variants (i.e., executables) of exactly the same version, which
look different to malware detectors.
An important open problem in malware lineage is identi-
fying the versions of a malware family among a set of input
executables belonging to the family. The study of malware
lineage goes back over 20 years and multiple approaches have
been proposed [11], [14], [24], [27], [30], [33], [35], [36],
[43], [48], [66], [74]. However, a persistent limitation of these
approaches is that they consider every input sample a separate
malware version. Thus, their output lineage graphs have a node
for every input sample. This is problematic because the pack-
ing process produces many polymorphic variants of a malware
version. Thus, many input samples should be represented by
the same node in the lineage graph. This problem does not
manifest in prior malware lineage approaches because they are
evaluated on synthetic malware, malware that is not packed,
or packed malware for which unpackers are readily available
(e.g., UPX [70]). But, the majority of malware is packed and
malware often uses custom packers for which off-the-shelf
unpackers are not available [68]. Thus, version identification
needs to be addressed with malware collected in the wild.
Identifying versions among packed samples from a mal-
ware family is a novel and challenging problem. This problem
differs from program similarity [22] because two versions of
the same family may be highly similar, but still different
versions. For example, one version may patch the previous
one by adding a conditional to fix an error condition. While
the two versions may be nearly identical, they need to be
represented by different nodes in the lineage graph. We address
this problem by considering malware samples with the same
set of functions as polymorphic variants, which should be
represented by the same node in the lineage graph. Any
changes in functionality between two samples such as adding a
function, removing a function, or updating an existing function,
means that both samples are from different versions, with their
own nodes in the lineage graph.
Another challenge with malware collected in the wild
is that we do not know how it was developed. Thus, we
need a lineage inference algorithm that works independently
of the development model used by the malware authors,
e.g., straight-line, multiple independent lines, branching and
merging. Unfortunately, iLine [33], the state-of-the-art lineage
inference algorithm, uses separate algorithms for straight-line
and branching and merging development. Thus, iLine requires
knowing in advance the development model of the software to
select the lineage algorithm. This is problematic with malware
since the development model is not known.
In this work, we propose a novel malware lineage approach
that works on malware samples collected in the wild. Given a
pool of malware executables from the same family, for which
no source code is available and which may be packed with
an unknown packer, it produces a lineage graph. Our malware
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lineage approach improves the state-of-art in two ways. First,
we propose the first technique to identify the different versions
of a malware family present in an input set of potentially
packed executables. In our lineage graph, a node identifies a
version of the malware family and represents all input samples
that are polymorphic variants of that version, which greatly
reduces the number of nodes compared to prior approaches that
create one node per input sample. Second, we propose a novel
lineage inference algorithm that works independently of the
development model used by the malware, and that improves
the accuracy compared to iLine, the state-of-the-art lineage
inference approach.
Performing lineage inference on malware samples collected
in the wild requires addressing other challenges such as
malware clustering [6], [32], [57], [60], unpacking [8], [17],
[34], [49], [62], and disassembly [41], [44]. To address these
challenges we adapt existing state-of-the-art solutions. In other
words, our goal is not to propose novel malware clustering,
unpacking, and disassembly techniques. Rather, we want to
understand how far we can get using state-of-the-art techniques
and to identify areas where improvements are needed. To this
end, we propose two novel metrics to quantify the accuracy of
the malware unpacking and disassembly process.
Our approach works as follows: Since malware executables
are collected in the wild without labels indicating their family,
we first cluster input executables into malware families. Then,
each malware sample is unpacked using a generic dynamic
unpacker. The unpacker recovers the original code as raw byte
sequences in memory snapshots. To enable malware lineage,
we need to represent the code in a form that enables further
analysis. For this, we disassemble the unpacked malware code
by removing code overlaps, identifying function boundaries,
and applying dynamic information to improve disassembly
results. This process outputs the unpacked and disassembled
code as an IDA database [31], which serves as input to the
lineage inference module that produces the lineage graph.
We have implemented our malware lineage approach and
evaluated its accuracy on open-source programs, before ap-
plying it to 10 malware families. Our unpacking and disas-
sembly modules recover up to 81% of the original functions
of programs packed with 18 packers. The missing functions
are properly unpacked, but the function identification misses
their start addresses preventing their disassembly. We have
evaluated our lineage inference module on 631 versions of
13 open-source programs, covering over 59 years of software
development. Our lineage graphs achieve an average 95%
accuracy, which improves on iLine’s results, without requiring
apriori knowledge of the malware development model. We
also show that our version identification technique has better
accuracy and efficiency compared to using BinDiff.
We have also evaluated our approach on 7,793 packed
malware samples from 10 malware families. The generated
lineage graphs show that our approach can handle different
malware development models, i.e., straight line, k independent
lines, branching and merging. The lineage graphs succinctly
summarize the evolution of a malware family, achieving an
average 26 times reduction from number of input samples to
number of versions. For example, the 1, 354 SYTRO samples
are grouped into 6 versions in the SYTRO lineage graph.
Our contributions are:
• We propose a novel approach for malware lineage that
works with malware collected in the wild. It takes as
input a set of samples from the same malware family
and outputs a lineage graph that describes ancestor-
descendant relationships among the family versions.
• We present the first technique for identifying the
versions present in a pool of samples from the same
malware family. Our technique classifies the input
samples into versions, identifying polymorphic vari-
ants of the same version.
• We propose a novel lineage inference algorithm that
works independently of the development process used
by the malware and that improves the accuracy com-
pared to the current state-of-the-art solution.
• We propose two metrics to quantify the accuracy of
the unpacking and disassembly process.
• We evaluate the accuracy of our lineage approach
on 13 open-source programs, achieving 95% accuracy
on the lineage graphs. We apply our approach to 10
malware families achieving a 26 times reduction from
input samples to versions.
II. OVERVIEW & PROBLEM DEFINITION
Our problem is given a set of malware samples from
the same malware family collected in the wild, to build a
lineage graph that captures the evolution of the malware family
across versions. Section II-A details the challenges introduced
by working on malware collected in the wild. Section II-B
details the problem. And, Section II-C describes the version
identification subproblem.
A. Challenges
The main requirement for our malware lineage approach is
to handle malware samples collected in the wild. This entails
the following challenges:
• Unknown versions. We ignore how many versions a
malware family has, i.e., we do not know apriori the
nodes in the lineage graph. Instead, we need to identify
which input samples correspond to different versions
and which are polymorphic variants of the same ver-
sion. This is a key difference from our approach with
respect to prior malware lineage approaches [11], [14],
[24], [27], [30], [33], [35], [36], [74] that consider
each input sample as a distinct version.
• Unknown development model. We ignore how a
malware family is developed. The current state-of-
the-art malware lineage approach is iLine [33], which
proposes different malware lineage algorithms for
different development models, e.g., one for straight-
line and another for branching and merging. But, with
malware we do not know apriori which development
model has been used. By contrast, we propose a single
lineage inference algorithm that works regardless of
the development model used.
• Unpacking. Malware is distributed as executables,
i.e., without source code, and those executables are
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Fig. 1: PICSYS lineage graph built using 131 samples. The
node label represents the number of distinct functions in the
version and number of samples of that version. The edge label
is the number of shared functions.
typically packed. Polymorphic variants are created
by repacking the same version multiple times. Our
approach unpacks the input malware executables to
recover the original code.
• Disassembly. Malware disassembly is a difficult prob-
lem [41]. Our disassembly module addresses code
overlaps, function identification, and uses dynamic
information to guide the disassembly. It outputs the
unpacked program as an IDA database.
• Unordered samples. The order in which malware
samples are collected may not mirror the order in
which their versions were developed. Thus, our lin-
eage inference approach does not rely on collection
timestamps.
B. The Lineage Graph
Given a set of malware samples S = {s1, . . . , sn} belong-
ing to the same malware family, our approach outputs a lineage
graph, i.e., a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V,E, F, L).
V is the set of nodes and each node vi ∈ V corresponds to a
different version of the malware family. Note that throughout
the paper we use node and version interchangeably. E ⊆ V ×V
is the set of edges, where an edge vi → vj indicates that vj
was derived from vi. The use of a DAG enables a version to
be derived from multiple parent versions, which may happen
when two development branches merge.
The function F : V → F labels each node with the
set of (unpacked) functions in that version, i.e., F (vi) =
{f1, f2, . . . , fk}. That is, we abstract a node by the set of
functions in that version (output by F ). Two nodes cannot have
the same set of functions, i.e., ∀i 6= j F (vi) 6= F (vj). Two
nodes connected by an edge share at least one function, i.e.,
vi → vj ⇒ |F (vi)∩F (vj)| > 0. Note that the function sharing
property is not transitive. Path vi → vj → vk indicates that vi
shares some functions with vj and vj shares some functions
with vk, but vi may not share any function with vk.
The function L : V → 2S labels each node with the
set of input samples that correspond to that version. Thus, L
partitions S into family versions, i.e., ∀i 6= j |L(vi)∩L(vj)| =
0 ∧ ∑i |L(vi)| = n. The number of input samples of a
version |L(vi)| intuitively captures the type of the version. For
example, nodes representing a large number of input samples
are likely to be major versions, while nodes representing a
few samples may indicate beta versions where some new
functionality is being tested.
Figure 1 shows the lineage graph our approach builds from
131 input samples from the PICSYS malware family. Our
lineage graph has 3 nodes, rather than 131 nodes (one per
sample) if prior approaches were used. The node labels are
|F (vi)|, |L(vi)|, i.e., the number of functions in the version
and the number of input samples of that version. The root
represents 5 input samples all with the same 16 functions. The
version following the root represents 95 samples that have all
16 functions in the root and an additional 351 functions.
C. Identifying Malware Versions
Our intuition to address the version identification problem
is that identifying versions in a pool of packed samples from
the same malware family is analogous to finding clusters
of semantically equivalent executables. On one hand, if two
executables are variants of the same version they should be
semantically equivalent, i.e., provide the same functionality,
assuming that the compilation and packing toolchains are
semantics-preserving. On the other hand, if two executables
are semantically equivalent, then they implement exactly the
same functionality and thus can be considered the same
version. Note that we focus on differences visible in the
binary code. If two versions simply refactor the source code
by changing indentation or renaming variables, those changes
are not visible in the executable. Thus, their executables have
the same functionality and we would consider them the same
binary version. That is, source versions are considered different
binary versions only if they change the program functionality.
Unfortunately, current solutions to check if two executables
are semantically equivalent are extremely expensive. In partic-
ular, BinHunt [23] requires between 30 minutes and 1 hour
to semantically compare two consecutive program versions.
Our smallest malware family has 113 samples, which would
require over 6 months to be compared by BinHunt. Due to the
quadratic number of comparisons, our largest family (4,000
samples) would take over 650 years. Other approaches perform
semantic similarity [20], [47], but semantic similarity is not
semantic equivalence because two versions of the same family
may have highly similar functionality, but still are different
versions, e.g., a version may simply add an error condition
over the previous version.
To address scalability we leverage that if two functions
have the same syntax, then their semantics are the same (but
not vice versa). Thus, we perform a normalized syntactic
matching between executables to efficiently identify re-packed
variants of the same version. For this, we first tried using
syntactic similarity tools [7], [9]. But, those tools introduce er-
rors for version identification because, similar to what happens
with semantic similarity approaches, two versions of the same
family may have highly similar syntax, but still are different
versions. Thus, using these tools produces false positives, i.e.,
different versions identified as being the same. Furthermore,
those tools perform pairwise comparisons, which create two
problems for lineage inference. First, they do not scale well,
e.g., after 8 hours BinDiff only completes 14% of the pairwise
comparisons for WINSCP’s 47 versions. Second, to support
branching and merging the lineage inference algorithm needs
to identify functions that appear in a version, but do not appear
in any predecessors (see Section VII). Such queries cannot be
performed efficiently using pairwise comparisons, but require
an indexing approach.
To address these limitations we use normalized function
hashes, which allow us to efficiently identify the same function
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despite instruction or block reordering and the introduction of
padding instructions that are semantically empty. The function
hashes can be combined into a program hash that identifies
samples that are the same version in O(1). Function hashes
also enable lineage inference to work because they allow us
to identify in O(1) all versions where a function is present.
Compilation toolchain. There are two cases in which we
may create multiple nodes in the lineage graph for the same
program version. First, if the same version is recompiled
with different compilers or compilation options. Second, if
the same version is packed with different packers. In essence,
we consider the compilation and packing toolchains to define
a version in addition to the source code. We believe both
situations, while possible, are rare with real malware. For
example, it makes little sense to use compilation options for
evasion (when a packer is already used for this goal) since
recompilation does not affect all functions and instructions,
and thus may not bypass AV signatures. If malware authors
recompile or repack the same version with different toolchains
our approach may overestimate the number of versions. Still,
compared to prior work, our approach achieves an order of
magnitude reduction between number of input executables and
number of versions in the lineage graph.
III. RELATED WORK
We have already compared with binary similarity ap-
proaches in Section II-C. This section describes related ap-
proaches on malware lineage, binary code indexing, unpack-
ing, and disassembly.
Malware lineage. The study of malware lineage goes back
over 20 years to the pioneering work of Sorkin [66] and
the phylogeny of the Stoned boot sector computer virus by
Hull [30]. Most previous research on malware lineage uses a
distance-based hierarchical clustering approach that produces
a phylogenetic tree [11], [35], [36], [48], [74]. Since phyloge-
netic trees cannot handle multiple ancestors for a node, other
approaches such as by Goldberg et al. [24] and iLine [33]
use a DAG. The above approaches analyze malware samples,
but lineage can also analyze textual metadata in online threat
libraries [27].
There are two fundamental differences between our ap-
proach and all prior work in malware lineage. (1) We want to
evaluate on real malware samples, which may be packed. All
above approaches evaluate on unpacked malware or malware
for which unpackers are available (e.g., UPX [70]). (2) We do
not know apriori the versions of a malware family, i.e., the
set of nodes in the lineage graph. Instead, we classify input
samples into versions and identify polymorphic variants of the
same version. In addition to those two differences, there are an-
other three differences between our work and iLine, the current
state-of-the-art for malware lineage. (3) We assume no apriori
knowledge of how the malware was developed and use the
same approach regardless of the development model (straight-
line, k independent lines, and branching and merging). (4) Our
lineage graph is at a finer level of granularity. Rather than using
higher level features such as n-grams, individual basic blocks,
or API calls observed during execution, we focus on comparing
malware samples at the level of individual unpacked functions.
This enables identifying what functions are added and removed
between two versions and how a version is derived from its
predecessors. (5) Malware disassembly is a challenging task,
which needs addressing, e.g., iLine bypasses it by compiling
the synthetic malware’s source using gcc -S to generate the
assembly ground truth.
A related line of work addresses the problem of how
to evaluate malware lineage approaches given the lack of
ground truth. Hayes et al. [28] propose using artificial malware
history generators, while Dumitras and Neamtiu [19] propose
evaluating on open-source software. We first evaluate the
accuracy of our approach on open-source software, before
applying it to malware.
Binary code indexing. Another line of work indexes binary
code to enable efficient code search [29], [37], [51]. Our
work also indexes the malware code to enable efficient search.
But, those approaches do not tackle malware lineage and also
differ in that they index call graphs [29], code fragments
inside functions [37], or libraries [51], rather than function
and program hashes in our approach.
Unpacking. Packer identification tools [56], [61] use signa-
tures to identify if a program is obfuscated with a specific
packer. Those tools can be used to select a static unpacker,
if available. Generic unpackers have been proposed to avoid
manually building static unpackers for each packer [8], [34],
[49], [62], [69]. Christodorescu et al. [12] and Renovo [34]
propose the write-then-execute property to identify unpacking,
used by many unpackers. Renovo also introduces the concept
of multiple code waves (or simply waves), which are created
by writing (i.e., unpacking) new code into memory and then
transferring execution to that unpacked code. Code waves were
later formalized by Debray et al. [15] and Guizani et al. [25].
Guo et al. [26] study the packer problem and propose heuristics
to detect the OEP. Ugarte et al. [68] propose a taxonomy of
packer complexity and perform a longitudinal study of custom
and off-the-shelf packers. In this work we use the unpacking
approach proposed by Bonfante et al. [8].
Disassembly. Much work has addressed the challenge of
disassembling binary code [1], [38], [39], [41], [44], [53], [63],
[76], which in general is an undecidable problem [73]. Most
related are approaches that address disassembly of malicious
code [41], [44], [63]. A challenging step during disassembly
is identifying the start and end of functions, which can be
performed using a machine learning classifier [5], [65]. In this
work we use ByteWeight [5] for function identification and
leverage instruction and function addresses observed during
program execution to improve the disassembly [10].
IV. APPROACH OVERVIEW
Figure 2 summarizes our approach. It takes as input a set
of program executables that belong to the same family and
outputs a lineage graph. If the input malware samples are not
labeled, as is often the case, we first cluster them using an
off-the-shelf malware clustering approach (not shown in the
figure). In this work, we use the AVClass tool [64], which
clusters and labels samples into known families using the AV
labels in VirusTotal [71] reports. While AV labels are known
to be noisy [4], [50], AVClass successfully removes noise by
performing label normalization, generic token detection, and
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Fig. 2: Approach overview. The execution recording and IDA tool are off-the-shelf components not developed in this work.
alias detection. AVClass outputs for each sample the most
likely family name and a confidence based on the agreement
across AV engines.
Each family for which we want to analyze its lineage goes
through processing depicted in Figure 2. For each sample in
the family, our processing produces an output IDA database
with the unpacked version of the sample’s code. The first step
in the processing of each sample is to run it using an execution
recording module, which performs a lightweight recording of
the execution that can be deterministically replayed as many
times as desired. For this, we use the off-the-shelf QEMU-
based PANDA record and replay platform [54]. PANDA’s
recording takes a snapshot of the VM state before execution
and records non-deterministic changes to the CPU state and
memory during execution. Such recording produces small
changelogs and does not significantly slow down the VM
(10%–20%), which limits time-related effects (e.g. network
timeouts) on the target application. Using a record-and-replay
platform enables separating the malware execution from the
malware analysis. The small logs enable efficient storage of
malware executions and the unpacking can be rerun every time
an improvement is available.
The recording is used as input to the unpacking (Section V)
and disassembly (Section VI) modules. The unpacking module
replays the recorded execution, while monitoring the instruc-
tions executed and the memory writes they perform. Every
time a memory area is written and then executed it identifies
a wave and takes a snapshot of the memory of the program.
For each wave, the unpacking module outputs 2 wave files:
a differential memory snapshot that stores the content of the
memory regions overwritten and an instruction log with the
unique instructions executed in the wave. Programs with only
one wave are not packed.
The disassembly module takes as input the wave files
produced by the unpacking and outputs an IDA database with
the unpacked code. It comprises of 3 steps: code region identifi-
cation, function identification, and instruction disassembly. For
each wave, it first loads the memory ranges in the differential
memory snapshot into the IDA database, relocating them to a
different address if that range is already occupied by previously
unpacked content. Then, it applies function identification to
find the start address of functions present in the differential
memory snapshot. Finally, it informs IDA to disassemble
inside each loaded range starting at the instruction addresses
in the instruction log, and to create functions at the addresses
identified by the function identification module.
The IDA databases for all samples in the family are input
to the lineage inference module, which outputs the lineage
graph (Section VII). The lineage inference module comprises
of 3 phases. First, it computes the hashes of all functions in
each IDA database and produces a program hash for each
sample by hashing the concatenation of the function hashes.
Second, it builds a lineage tree with the most likely parent for
each node. Finally, it adds cross-edges to the lineage tree, by
identifying if any node has additional parent nodes from which
it inherits functions. This last step transforms the lineage tree
into a lineage graph.
We have implemented our malware lineage approach using
over 11K lines of C/C++ and scripts (Python and Bash), as
measured by CLOC [13], i.e., without comments or blank
lines. Of those, 5.8K lines correspond to the PANDA unpack-
ing plugin, 1.5K to the IDA disassembly plugin, 3K to the
lineage module, and 1K to scripts that glue the end-to-end
processing.
V. UNPACKING
We desire four properties from our unpacking module: (1)
Support for both off-the-shelf (e.g., Armadillo, PESpin) and
custom packers. (2) Support for packers of different complexity
(as defined by Ugarte et al. [68]). Specifically we want to
support packers for which the unpacked original code may not
be fully available in memory at any point of the execution, and
samples that unpack code using multiple processes. However,
we focus on packers that do not modify the original code,
which excludes virtualization-based packers (e.g., Themida,
VMProtect). (3) Maximize coverage, i.e., recover as much
original code as possible. (4) Minimize noise, i.e., output as
little code not part of the original code as possible.
We use the unpacking approach proposed by Bonfante et
al. [8], which satisfies the first three properties mentioned
above and to which we add differential memory snapshots
to support the fourth property. Their approach runs the pro-
gram and takes a memory snapshot before the first program
instruction executes and at each wave change. Their wave
semantics define when wave changes happen and guarantee
that any code unpacked during execution will be present in a
memory snapshot. Note that the unpacked code is a superset of
the executed code, i.e., the memory snapshots typically contain
much “dormant” original code, which was unpacked but not
executed. For example, wave Wi may unpack a function that
contains a conditional. Only one branch of the conditional may
be executed, but the code reachable through the other branch is
also present in the memory snapshot taken before Wi+1 starts.
There are two main differences between [8] and our
unpacking module. First, their unpacking code is not available
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and was built on top of Pin [46]. In contrast, our unpacking
module is implemented as a plugin for the PANDA record and
replay platform [54], which enables us to separate malware
execution recording (which can be performed on dedicated
malware farms [40], [72]) from the unpacking. It also provides
better malware isolation and allows the future support of other
QEMU-supported architectures. Second, our unpacking mini-
mizes the noise by producing a differential memory snapshot
for each wave, in contrast with the process-level snapshot
produced by Bonfante et al. The motivation for this is that
a wave’s snapshot shares much content with the snapshot of
the prior wave. For example, the execution may first unpack
a function f1 and execute it (first wave), then unpack another
function f2 and execute it (second wave). In this case, the
first snapshot contains f1, while the second snapshot contains
both f1 and f2. Removing the redundancy between snapshots
reduces the noise in the IDA database output by the unpacking
and disassembly modules.
Unpacking overview. The unpacking module takes as input
the execution log that records a run of a potentially packed
program P . It replays the execution log and uses the wave
semantics to identify waves in the list of tracked processes,
which is initialized with the input process P and to which
any new process created (or injected from) a tracked process
is added. At the beginning of the execution of each tracked
process, a full memory snapshot of the process address space
is taken. New waves are detected by monitoring, for each
instruction executed by a tracked process, the memory ranges
it may overwrite and whether previously overwritten bytes are
being executed. For each new wave of a tracked process, the
unpacking outputs a differential memory snapshot and a wave
instruction log. The differential memory snapshot of wave Wi
stores the memory contents modified by the previous Wi−1
wave. It includes modified bytes in the main module, other
modules, the heap, and the stack. The wave instruction log
contains the instructions executed during the wave and marks
instructions following calls as function entry points.
VI. DISASSEMBLY
The unpacking module guarantees that the code the pro-
gram unpacked during execution is present in the differential
memory snapshots. However, it is present as part of a long
sequence of raw bytes, which is not particularly useful. The
goal of the disassembly module is given as input the instruc-
tion logs and differential memory snapshots produced by the
unpacking, to output an IDA database where the instructions
and functions in the unpacked code have been identified. IDA
is arguably the most widely used reverse-engineering tool and
already used by most malware analysts. Furthermore, popular
IDA plugins exist for diffing two unpacked executables such
as BinDiff [7] and Diaphora [16].
Next, we detail the three disassembly steps: memory range
loading, function identification, and instruction disassembly.
Memory range loading. The disassembly combines all the
unpacked code into the same IDA database. This includes code
unpacked by all the waves observed during execution, from the
original process executed as well as from any child process it
may create. Intuitively, if all the code comes from the same
input packed executable, then it should be available together
to the analyst as if the input executable was not packed.
Loading the contents of the differential memory snapshots
into the IDA database comprises of three substeps: removing
duplicate ranges, (optionally) selecting ranges, and relocating
overlapping ranges. The use of differential memory snapshots
prevents a memory range unpacked in wave Wi to appear in the
snapshots of waves Wi+1, . . . ,Wn. But, some packers (e.g.,
YodaProtector) unpack the same content on the same memory
range again and again. This behavior would introduce many
duplicates of the same content in the IDA database. To prevent
this, when a memory range is loaded into the IDA database,
its original address and the hash of its contents are logged. If
a range has the same original address and contents of another
range already loaded, it is a duplicate and can be skipped.
By default, all (non-duplicate) memory ranges in the dif-
ferential memory snapshots are loaded into the IDA database.
This includes ranges in the regions of the main module, other
modules, heap, and stack. Some of those ranges may only
contain data. An analyst, depending on the end application,
may prefer to exclude data ranges to reduce the size of
the final IDA database. The disassembly module allows an
analyst to specify filters on which ranges should be loaded.
For example, an analyst could specify that ranges on the stack
or the heap should not be loaded, or that only ranges in pages
with execution permission should be loaded.
While loading the selected memory ranges, the disassembly
module monitors if two memory ranges overlap. If so, one
of them needs to be relocated because IDA does not support
having multiple contents at the same memory range. Internally,
IDA uses a linear address space where analysts can create
segments, which represent contiguous chunks in the linear
address space. Creating a segment requires the start and end
addresses of the segment in the linear address space, and
the segment base. The segment base is used to compute
virtual addresses for the segments, which are the addresses an
analyst sees. The conversion from linear to virtual addresses is:
V irtualAddress = LinearAddress − (SegmentBase <<
4). The disassembly module loads each range in each wave of
each tracked process as a separate segment. It starts by creating
a segment at the base address of the main module of the initial
malware process, which corresponds to the contents of the
packed malware sample. For each wave of the initial malware
process, it creates another segment following the previous one
in the linear address space1, adjusting the segment base so that
virtual addresses in the new segment follow virtual addresses in
the prior segment. When a wave is relocated, the disassembly
module scans the disassembled instructions and rewrites any
addresses found in the disassembled code to point to the same
location as before the relocation. Once all waves of the initial
process have been loaded, the memory range loading repeats
for any other tracked processes.
Function identification. An important step when disassem-
bling a program is identifying functions. Our disassembly
module uses two techniques to locate function entry points
and instructs IDA to create functions at those addresses. First,
it uses the instructions marked in the wave instruction log to
have followed a call instruction. This helps identify targets of
indirect calls that appeared in the execution. Second, it uses
1Segments are separated by a 16 byte gap
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ByteWeight [5] to locate the start address of functions in each
of the regions loaded into the IDA database. This method can
identify the entry point of functions that did not execute during
unpacking. However, ByteWeight identifies functions in the
text section of an input executable. Instead, we want to identify
functions in the raw regions of memory contained in the differ-
ential memory snapshots. Thus, we have modified ByteWeight
to take as input a sequence of assembly instructions, rather than
a full executable. Our disassembly module first disassembles
10 instructions starting at each offset in a region and inputs
those instructions to the modified ByteWeight, which outputs a
score between 0 and 1 indicating how likely the disassembled
instructions correspond to a function start. As recommended
in [5], the address of any sequence of instructions with a score
higher than 0.5 is considered a function start.
Instruction disassembly. The instruction disassembly lever-
ages the function start addresses identified by ByteWeight and
dynamic information from the execution, e.g., to identify tar-
gets of executed indirect jumps. First, our disassembly module
instructs IDA to start disassembling at every identified function
start address. Then, it instructs IDA to start disassembling at
every instruction in the wave instruction logs. For this, the
information in the instruction log is used to identify which
wave unpacked the instruction, which is used to locate the IDA
segment where the instruction has been loaded. Note that when
IDA is instructed to disassemble at an address, it performs a
recursive disassembly to find as much code as possible. Thus,
it also disassembles dormant code captured in the differential
memory snapshots, which did not execute during the execution
recording.
VII. LINEAGE INFERENCE
The lineage inference module takes as input the IDA
databases of the family samples with the unpacked and dis-
assembled code and produces the lineage graph. It comprises
of three phases. The first phase identifies the nodes in the
lineage graph (Section VII-A) and also constructs the L and
F functions (see Section II). The other two phases identify the
edges in the lineage graph. The second phase builds a lineage
tree starting with a selected root and greedily inserting the
most similar node, not yet in the tree, to any node already
in the tree (Section VII-B). In the lineage tree each node has
at most one parent. The third phase identifies whether some
nodes inherit code from multiple nodes and thus need to have
more than one parent (Section VII-C). The complexity analysis
of the three phases is provided in Appendix A.
A. Phase I: Identifying Versions
Identifying the set of nodes in the lineage graph requires
finding which input samples correspond to each family version.
In our approach, two input samples are the same version if they
have the same set of functions. To uniquely identify a function
we use a function hash. The use of a function hash is critical
for scalability. It enables identifying all samples that contain
a specific function in O(1), a fundamental step in phase III.
Our approach works with different function hashes. Each
hash can have different properties and may produce a different
set of nodes for the lineage graph. Overall, we seek function
hashes that determine that two functions are the same with
Algorithm 1: Lineage graph inference phase II.
Input: Family versions V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
Output: Lineage tree T
1 begin
2 T ← ({}, {})
3 // Pick smallest node as root
4 v ← minNode(V)
5 T.addNode(v)
6 V.remove(v)
7 // Greedily insert nodes
8 while V 6= {} do
9 // p ∈ T.V, v ∈ V
10 (p,v) ← findMostSimilarPair(T,V)
11 T.addEge(p,v)
12 V.remove(v)
13 end
14 return(T)
15 end
low false positives, and are efficient to compute and index.
Currently, our approach supports two such function hashes:
Raw hash. Performs an MD5 hash of the sequence of raw byte
values from function start to function end. Two functions with
the same raw hash have the same bytes and thus are the same
function. This hash does not require disassembly and should
not produce false positives. On the other hand, it can have
high false negatives when modifications have been applied to
the function that do not affect its functionality, e.g., semantics-
preserving instruction reordering. We use this hash as baseline
for comparison.
SPP-NOP hash. The small prime product (SPP) assigns to
each instruction mnemonic a small prime number. The hash
corresponds to the product of the primes of all mnemonics
of the instructions in the disassembled function [18]. We have
modified the SPP hash computation to ignore instructions used
for padding that do not affect the function semantics, e.g.,
the no-op (NOP) instruction and a move from a register to
the same register. The advantage of SPP-NOP over the raw
hash is that it can detect the same function despite instruction
reordering, block reordering, and instruction padding.
This phase first iterates on all the functions in each input
IDA database, computing both the raw and SPP-NOP function
hashes, and storing them in a central database. Short functions
with at most two instructions are ignored. Then, it computes
a raw program hash and a SPP-NOP program hash for each
sample by sorting the (raw or SPP-NOP) function hashes for
the sample, concatenating them separated by a delimiter, and
hashing the concatenation using MD5. Each program hash
represents one version in the lineage graph. Samples with
the same program hash are polymorphic variants of the same
version.
The raw and SPP-NOP hashes may produce different sets
of nodes for the lineage graph. The raw hash gives an upper
bound on the number of nodes since it should not have false
positives. Thus, the number of nodes using the SPP-NOP hash
is always less than or equal to the number of nodes using the
raw hash. While they can produce different node sets, both
hashes often agree. Specifically, in 10 out of 13 open-source
programs and in 1 out of 10 malware families evaluated, both
hashes produce the same set of nodes.
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Algorithm 2: Lineage graph inference phase III.
Input: Lineage tree T
Output: Lineage graph G
1 begin
2 G ← T.removeZeroSimilarityEdges()
3 V ← topologicalSort(G.V)
4 foreach v ∈ V do
5 // Find added functions (not in parent)
6 p ← G.findParent(v)
7 Fa ← F(v) \ F(p)
8 // Find candidate parents for cross-edge
9 C = G.V \ (G.successors(v) ∪ G.predecessors(v))
10 // Find cross-edges
11 X = findCrossEdges(Fa,C)
12 // Add cross-edges to graph
13 foreach (p, c) ∈ X do
14 G.addEdge(p,c)
15 end
16 end
17 return(G)
18 end
B. Phase II: Building a Lineage Tree
Given the nodes identified in Phase I, Phase II greedily
builds a lineage tree where each node has a single parent. Its
processing is described in Algorithm 1. Starting with an empty
tree, it first inserts as root the node that minimizes the sum
of its size (i.e., number of functions) and the average distance
to all other nodes. This root selection is inspired by Lehman’s
6th software evolution law (“Continuing growth”), which states
that programs tend to grow over time [42]. Then, it iterates
inserting at each step the node, not yet in the tree, with the
highest number of shared functions to any node already in
the tree. The iteration terminates when all nodes have been
inserted.
The function findMostSimilarPair greedily selects the next
edge to insert and needs to handle two classes of ties. First,
there could be multiple candidate nodes not yet in the tree that
share the same number of functions with a node already in the
tree. Here, the candidate with highest number of instructions
shared with a node in the tree is selected. Second, the node
to be inserted could share the same number of functions (or
instructions) with multiple nodes already in the tree. Among
those, the node latest inserted in the tree is picked as parent.
An special case happens when the remaining nodes, not yet
in the tree, share very few (or no) functions with nodes already
in the tree (we use an experimentally determined threshold
of less than 2% similarity). This may indicate independent
development lines or a large refactoring of the code. In this
case, the algorithm picks the smallest node not yet in the tree
as the next to insert, rather than the one most similar to a node
in the tree (since none remaining are similar to those in the
tree). An edge is added between the selected node and the most
similar node in the tree. If the number of shared functions is
zero, phase III will later remove those edges, thus introducing
multiple independent lines.
C. Phase III: Adding Cross-Edges
Each node in the lineage tree has at most one parent.
However, it is possible for a version to descend from multiple
versions, e.g., when a development branch is merged back into
the trunk. Phase III identifies versions with multiple parents.
Algorithm 2 describes this phase. The first step is to remove
any edges with zero shared functions. This removal introduces
additional roots, identifying independent development lines.
Then, it iterates on the nodes in topological order. For the
current node, it first computes the set of added functions,
i.e., functions in this version that are not inherited from
the parent version. Then, it selects the candidate parents for
a cross-edge, which are the nodes that are not successors
or predecessors of the current node. Successors are ignored
because a cross-edge from them would introduce a cycle in the
graph. Predecessors are ignored because they already influence
the current node. Function findCrossEdges picks among the
parent candidates the one that shares the most added func-
tions with the current node. Then it removes those functions
from the set of added functions and picks the next node
that shares the most remaining added functions. The process
terminates when no candidates share more than a threshold t
of functions, which we have determined experimentally to be
3. Once findCrossEdges returns, the cross-edges are added to
the graph. Note that the use of a function hash is fundamental
in findCrossEdges because it allows us to query in O(1) time
if a function in the set of added functions is present in any
candidate parent.
VIII. EVALUATION ON BENIGN PROGRAMS
In this section we evaluate the accuracy of our approach on
benign open-source programs for which we have ground truth.
Section VIII-A presents the accuracy metrics, Section VIII-B
the unpacking and disassembly results, and Section VIII-C
the lineage inference results. The evaluation on malware is
in Section IX.
A. Accuracy Metrics
No prior unpacking approach proposes metrics to scien-
tifically quantify the quality of the unpacking. Quoting a
recent unpacking work: “we recognize that we have not been
able to define a metric that allow us to adequately determine
code coverage” [8]. We propose to evaluate the accuracy of
the unpacking and disassembly process by measuring how
similar the original program (before packing) is to its unpacked
representation. For this, we compare the IDA database of the
original program, disassembled using symbol information to
prevent errors, with the IDA database output after packing
the program, and processing the packed program with the
unpacking and disassembly modules.
We propose two new metrics that separately quantify the
amount of original code recovered and the amount of noise.
We denote the set of functions in the original program database
Fo and in the unpacked program database Fu. We denote
the set of correctly unpacked original functions as F ou ⊆ Fu.
Correctly unpacked functions are the unpacked functions also
present in the original code, i.e., F ou = Fu ∩ Fo. Intuitively,
unpacked functions that are not original code can be considered
noise, i.e., Fnu = Fu \ F ou . This noise includes, among others,
unpacking functions and falsely identified functions during
disassembly. Given the original and noise functions in the
unpacked output, we define two metrics to evaluate accuracy:
function coverage (FC) and function noise ratio (FNR).
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Packer Version |P | FC FNRMin Avg Max Min Avg Max
ACProtect 2.0 21 48.68% 68.73% 79.79% 23.74% 39.57% 76.00%
Armadillo 8.20 2 61.22% 61.74% 62.26% 32.65% 35.71% 38.78%
ASPack 2.12 21 46.91% 70.48% 81.53% 16.62% 24.18% 40.35%
eXPressor 1.8.0.1 21 47.01% 70.58% 81.53% 16.74% 24.79% 43.33%
FSG 2.0 21 46.91% 70.48% 81.53% 15.69% 21.49% 30.73%
MEW 11 SE 1.2 21 46.91% 70.48% 81.53% 16.47% 22.60% 31.14%
MoleBox 2.5.13 21 48.78% 68.63% 79.79% 27.87% 46.28% 86.55%
MPRESS 2.19 21 49.14% 69.46% 80.14% 15.23% 22.24% 33.33%
Packman 1.0 21 46.91% 70.48% 81.53% 15.84% 21.77% 30.87%
PECompact 1.71 21 46.91% 70.48% 81.53% 16.08% 22.58% 33.33%
PELock 2.04 21 48.78% 69.25% 79.79% 25.81% 36.61% 47.73%
PESpin 1.33 21 48.68% 67.49% 79.44% 20.26% 29.25% 55.74%
Petite 2.4 21 47.01% 70.48% 81.53% 15.97% 22.28% 32.00%
RLPack 1.21 21 48.62% 69.10% 79.79% 17.02% 24.55% 39.29%
UPX 3.91 21 47.01% 70.48% 81.53% 15.66% 21.16% 30.73%
WinUPack 0.39 21 46.91% 70.48% 81.53% 15.69% 21.39% 30.73%
YodaCrypter 1.3 20 48.68% 69.14% 79.79% 16.79% 24.31% 41.18%
YodaProtector 1.03 21 48.68% 68.74% 79.79% 22.37% 34.69% 71.96%
All 21 46.91% 69.26% 81.53% 15.23% 27.53% 86.55%
TABLE I: Unpacking and disassembly accuracy evaluation on all SPEC CPU 2006 C programs with SPP-NOP, each packed
with 18 packers. For each packer it shows the number of programs evaluated, function coverage, and function noise ratio.
Function coverage. The fraction of original functions the
unpacking recovers over the number of functions in the original
program. Ranges from zero (no original functions recovered)
to one (all original functions recovered):
FC =
|F ou |
|Fo| =
|Fu ∩ Fo|
|Fo| (1)
Function noise ratio. The fraction of noise functions over the
total number of functions in the unpacked representation of
the program. Ranges from zero (no noise) to one (all noise,
no original functions recovered):
FNR =
|Fnu |
|Fu| =
|Fu \ F ou |
|Fu| (2)
When computing FC and FNR we identify a function by
its SPP-NOP hash, and we ignore short functions, i.e., those
with at most two instructions, since those can cause spurious
matches.
B. Unpacking & Disassembly Accuracy
We evaluate the accuracy of the unpacking and disassem-
bly modules using a dataset of 21 programs for which we
have the source code: 19 C programs from the SPEC CPU
2006 benchmark [67] and 2 C++ programs from the Olden
benchmark [45]. We compile them using Visual Studio with
optimization level -O2 and debugging symbols, producing an
executable and a PDB symbols file. We use IDA to disassemble
them providing the PDB symbols file as input. Next, we pack
the executables with 18 off-the-shelf packers and examine that
they work. We find that the SPEC CPU 2006 programs do not
work after packing with Armadillo, but the 2 Olden benchmark
programs work. There is also one SPEC CPU 2006 program
that does not work after being packed with YodaCrypter. We
input the correctly packed executables to the unpacking and
disassembly modules, which output an IDA database with the
recovered code.
Table I summarizes the accuracy results using the metrics
described in Section VIII-A. Overall, our unpacking and
disassembly modules achieve an average function coverage
of 69% and an average function noise ratio of 27%. Manual
analysis of the results shows that: (a) all original functions are
present in the differential memory snapshots and thus in the
unpacked IDA database, (b) the same functions are missed in a
program regardless of the packer, (c) the disassembly process
fails to identify always the start of the same functions, and
(d) the vast majority of additional functions (i.e., noise) are
added by the packing process to perform the unpacking at
runtime. Thus, all the original code is present in the differential
memory snapshots output by the unpacking, but, regardless of
the packer, the disassembly process fails to identify the entry
point of the same functions. Next, we analyze this issue in more
detail using the BHBmk program from the Olden benchmark.
We observe the same causes in other programs.
For BHBmk, the analysis reveals that ByteWeight only
finds 37 original functions (i.e., misses 15 functions) despite all
functions being present in the differential memory snapshots
provided as input to ByteWeight. Manual analysis on the
missed functions shows two reasons. First, 9 functions are
wrappers to other functions. These wrappers start with a
sequence of push instructions followed by a call to the wrapped
function, which is a common sequence in the middle of
functions and thus not detected by ByteWeight as a function
entry point. Second, 6 functions have uncommon preambles
not in the ByteWeight model. Note that even if ByteWeight
misses a function start, IDA may still identify the function
if there is a direct call to it. Of the 15 BHBmk functions
missed by ByteWeight, IDA identifies 10 this way. There are
also 4 functions whose start address ByteWeight finds, but
IDA refuses to create a function at that address. There are
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two reasons for this. First, IDA may run into a disassembly
error inside the function failing to find the function’s boundary.
Second, IDA may have already marked that code as belonging
to another function and refuses to create a new function there.
To conclude, the unpacking module properly outputs all
original code into the differential memory snapshots, but not all
original functions would be available to the lineage inference
because the disassembly misses some functions. Most of the
missed functions are due to ByteWeight and we plan to
either improve it or replace it in our next release. Most of
the additional functions (i.e., noise) implement the unpacking
process and we plan to identify those as a next step.
C. Lineage Inference Accuracy
To evaluate the lineage inference we use 631 release ver-
sions of 13 open-source Windows programs. Seven of the pro-
grams are part of the PUTTY distribution [59] (PUTTY, PUT-
TYGEN, PUTTYTEL, PSFTP, PSCP, PLINK, PAGEANT),
three are part of FILEZILLA [21] (FILEZILLA, FZPUT-
TYGEN, FZSFTP), and the other three are WINSCP [75],
NOTEPAD++ [52], and PROCESSHACKER [58]. We are in-
terested in evaluating the lineage inference as a stand-alone
module. Thus, we evaluate on the released (i.e., unpacked)
executables. To evaluate a program, we generate an IDA
database for the executable of each version and input these
IDA databases to the lineage inference module to produce
the lineage graph. Then, we compare the lineage graph to the
expected lineage graph built using the version numbers.
We manually identify the number of binary versions among
the input releases. There are three main reasons why consec-
utive source releases may not create a new binary version.
First, some versions do not modify the source code, but only
auxiliary files (e.g., configuration files, images). This happens,
for example, between FILEZILLA 3.9.0 and 3.9.0.1. Second,
some versions perform source code modifications that do not
affect the final executable, e.g., variable renaming. Third, in
distributions with multiple programs, source code changes may
affect some programs, but not others. For example, the changes
between 0.61 and 0.62 affected PUTTY and PUTTYTEL, but
not PUTTYGEN. Thus, PUTTYGEN 0.61 and 0.62 are the
same binary version.
Table II summarizes the results. For each program it
shows the first and last versions analyzed. Then, it shows
the expected lineage graph type, the number of releases, and
the number of binary versions (i.e., ground truth). The type
can be S for straight-line, 2-S for two straight lines, and D
for branching and merging, i.e., DAG. Next, it shows for the
lineage graph generated using each hash: the number of nodes
and root nodes, the number of cross-edges, and the partial order
agreement, a measure of lineage graph accuracy proposed in
iLine [33]. Finally, it shows the PO agreement using iLine’s
DAG and straight-line algorithms.
The results for Phase I show that the versions identified by
the SPP-NOP hash match the expected binary versions for all
13 programs, while the raw hash identifies the correct binary
versions for 9 programs. For the 3 FILEZILLA programs, the
number of nodes identified by the SPP-NOP and raw hashes
differs, with the raw hash identifying a larger number of
binary versions. In all cases, when a node in the lineage graph
represents multiple releases (each with a different executable
hash), those releases are consecutive. These results indicate
that the SPP-NOP hash is better at identifying versions than
the raw hash.
Analysis of the phase II results shows that the generated
lineage tree is more accurate with the SPP-NOP hash in 9
programs and has the same accuracy with both hashes in 4
programs. Thus, the SPP-NOP hash works better than the raw
hash also in this phase. The most common error is that a
version x is more similar to version x+2 than to version x+1.
These errors happen in all but one program and manifest in
two cases: two consecutive versions swap their positions or a
version has two successors one creating a branch with a single
node and no merging point. An example of the first case is
PUTTYGEN where version 0.58 is followed by 0.60, which is
followed by 0.59. An example of the second case is FZSFTP
version 3.0.6, which is followed by both 3.0.7.1 and 3.0.8.1.
The latter is followed by all other versions, while 3.0.7.1 is
in a branch by itself. Another error affecting 2 programs is
that the wrong root is chosen, i.e., the chosen root is not the
earliest version, but the second earliest.
All programs have the correct number of roots, one
for straight line or DAG development, and two for PRO-
CESSHACKER that has two separate lines. For the 12 programs
with straight-line (or 2-straight) development, phase III can
only introduce errors as there is no branching and merging.
But, our algorithm should identify those cases and avoid
inserting cross-edges. The results show that cross-edges are
inserted for 7 programs. In 5 of those programs only 1 or 2
cross-edges are inserted and these typically are inserted where
there was an error in Phase II. For example, Figure 3 shows
the final lineage graph for PUTTY. Version 0.48 is followed
by versions 0.49 and 0.50 after Phase II, and phase III inserts
cross-edges between 0.49 and 0.50 and between 0.51 and 0.52.
If 0.50 had followed 0.49 after Phase II, no cross-edge would
have been inserted as 0.49 would be a predecessor of 0.50 and
thus not included in the list of candidate parents. The same
applies to the cross-edge from 0.51 to 0.52. Figure 4 shows
the final lineage graph for FZPUTTYGEN. In this case, the
lineage graph has no errors and perfectly matches its straight-
line development.
Comparison with iLine. We compare our lineage inference
algorithm with iLine, the current state-of-the-art lineage infer-
ence approach. iLine proposes two different lineage inference
algorithms for straight-line code and branching and merging,
and assumes the analyst knows which of the algorithms should
be used (or which results to trust if both algorithms are used).
Since iLine is not publicly available we have re-implemented
both of its algorithms. The two rightmost columns in Table II
show the results for iLine’s DAG and straight-line (SL) algo-
rithms using as symmetric distance the number of differing
functions between both samples according to the SPP-NOP
hash. This allows us to compare iLine’s algorithms with our
algorithm using similar features. To measure accuracy, we
use the partial ordering agreement (PO) metric proposed in
iLine. For PROCESSHACKER, we first split versions into both
development lines and apply iLine’s SL algorithm in each
line separately. Our lineage inference module using SPP-NOP
achieves an average 95% PO over the 13 programs, compared
to 84% for iLine’s DAG and 93% for iLine’s straight line.
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Reference SPP-NOP Raw iLine (PO) BinDiff
Program First Last Type Rel. |V | |V | |R| |X| PO |V | |R| |X| PO DAG SL |V |
FileZilla 3.0.0 3.24.0 S 121 119 119 1 18 99% 121 1 20 97% 96% 100% 118
Fzputtygen 3.0.8 3.24.0 S 108 19 19 1 0 100% 30 1 0 96% 51% 99% 18
Fzsftp 3.0.0 3.24.0 S 118 50 50 1 0 91% 52 1 2 34% 38% 48% 43
Notepad++ 1.0 7.3 D 70 70 70 1 6 64% 70 1 14 71% 76% 71% 70
Pageant 0.50 0.67 S 18 18 18 1 0 93% 18 1 0 97% 84% 99% 18
Plink 0.50 0.67 S 18 18 18 1 0 98% 18 1 1 90% 84% 99% 17
ProcessHacker 1.0 2.39 2-S 52 52 52 2 1 99% 52 2 8 79% 86% 100% 52
PSCP 0.48 0.67 S 20 20 20 1 1 99% 20 1 1 73% 96% 99% 19
PSFTP 0.52 0.67 S 16 16 16 1 0 99% 16 1 0 88% 95% 99% 15
PuTTY 0.46 0.67 S 22 22 22 1 2 100% 22 1 0 92% 98% 99% 21
PuTTYgen 0.51 0.67 S 17 16 16 1 0 99% 16 1 0 75% 87% 99% 16
PuTTYtel 0.49 0.52 S 4 4 4 1 1 100% 4 1 0 50% 100% 100% 4
WinSCP 4.2.6 5.9.3 S 47 47 47 1 1 99% 47 1 8 94% 99% 100% 47
TABLE II: Lineage inference evaluation on 13 open-source programs. For each program, it first shows the earliest and last
versions analyzed. Then, the expected lineage graph type (S for straight-line, 2-S for two straight lines, and D for DAG), the
number of releases, and the number of expected binary versions (i.e., ground truth). Next, for the lineage graph generated using
each hash: the number of nodes (|V |) and root nodes (|R|), the number of cross-edges (|X|), and the partial order (PO) agreement.
The next two columns show the PO agreement using iLine’s DAG and straight-line (SL) algorithms. The final column shows
the number of versions identified using BinDiff.
0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.670.46 0.47 0.48 0.49
0.50 0.51
0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59
* *
Fig. 3: PUTTY lineage graph. Cross-edges are marked with asterisk.
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Fig. 4: FZPUTTYGEN lineage graph.
Thus, our algorithm outperforms both of iLine’s algorithms
despite using no apriori knowledge about the development
model, which is fundamental when operating with malware.
The best results for iLine are obtained by assuming straight-
line development, but this means that a wrong (straight-line)
lineage graph would be produced for any program using
branching and merging.
Comparison with BinDiff. We compare our Phase I results
with BinDiff. Pairwise comparison of all versions does not
finish in 8 hours for WINSCP and FILEZILLA. To address
this, we first partition the executables by number of functions
(i.e., executables with differing number of functions should
be different versions) and only perform pairwise comparisons
inside each partition. After aligning two executables with
BinDiff we consider they are the same version if BinDiff
successfully aligns all the functions in both executables and
the similarity value for each function is over 0.9. The righmost
column in Table II shows that in 7 out of 13 programs, this
approach would introduce errors, i.e., incorrectly identifying
similar versions as being the same. Furthermore, note that we
cannot use BinDiff in Phase III of our algorithm because it
cannot check if a function appears in any of the predecessor
nodes. We need function hashes for that.
Packed evaluation. To evaluate the lineage inference accuracy
with packed executables, we perform the following experiment.
We pack each version of PUTTY using a randomly selected
packer and then apply the unpacking, disassembly, and lineage
inference modules to build the lineage graph. This allows us to
evaluate our lineage inference approach when different packers
are used by the same program, as well as to check the impact
on the lineage graph of any functions missed by the unpacking
and disassembly modules. Figure 5 shows the produced lineage
graph, which is identical to the unpacked version in Figure 3.
In summary, our evaluation has shown that: the SPP-
NOP hash outperforms the raw hash both in node and edge
identification; the lineage graphs produced using the SPP-NOP
hash are more accurate than those produced by iLine, without
assuming a specific development model was used; our version
identification improves on BinDiff; and the lineage graphs are
accurate despite the use of different packers.
IX. EVALUATION ON MALWARE
This section evaluates our lineage approach on 10 malware
families. We first describe our dataset, then in Section IX-A
we present the unpacking and disassembly results, and in
Section IX-B the lineage inference results.
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Fig. 5: Lineage graph for PUTTY when each version is packed with a different packer.
Unpacking Disassembly
Family EXE Instructions (M) Processes Waves Time |Fu| TimeMin Avg Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Max Avg(s) Min Avg Max Avg(s)
Allaple 4,000 0.006 3.1 497.7 1 1.00 1 1 4.00 5 399 11 25 458 59
IRCbot 365 0.1 54.5 655.9 1 1.99 3 1 3.87 5 460 5 655 700 114
Klez 750 6.8 7.8 11.6 1 1.00 1 1 4.93 5 126 5 749 810 65
Loring 216 36.2 49.6 51.9 2 2.00 2 2 3.99 4 361 84 697 700 164
Memery 113 172.2 282.6 298.5 1 1.00 1 2 2.00 2 1,483 127 127 128 27
Picsys 131 7.8 11.0 11.3 1 1.00 1 1 1.96 2 513 24 698 737 109
Simbot 214 29.7 101.0 202.1 1 2.00 3 2 4.29 5 671 18 85 160 56
Sytro 1,354 2.6 4.5 8.2 1 1.00 1 1 1.87 2 119 21 702 810 33
Urelas 206 0.006 252.8 924.1 1 3.61 7 1 9.29 215 860 57 2,171 5,951 366
VtFlooder 444 0.006 1,379.5 3,439.3 1 1.00 1 1 2.26 6 1,927 10 138 1,058 36
TABLE III: Unpacking and disassembly results on packed malware. For each family, it shows the executables analyzed,
instructions (in millions) traced for all malware processes, malware processes traced; waves for all malware processes, unpacking
runtime, number of unpacked functions in the IDA databases, and disassembly runtime.
Dataset. The PANDA team periodically records malware ex-
ecutions on a sandbox and makes these recordings publicly
available [55]. The malware in those recordings is unlabeled,
i.e., its family is unknown. To classify the malware, we
first collect the AV labels for the samples using VirusTotal
(VT) [71], an online service that analyzes files and URLs sub-
mitted by users. We use the AV labels as input to AVClass [3],
an open-source malware labeling tool. AVClass outputs for
each sample the most likely family name and a confidence
factor based on the agreement across AV engines [64]. To
compute the lineage graph we need a significant number of
samples for the same family. Thus, we select 10 malware
families for which more than 100 samples are labeled with
high confidence by AVClass: ALLAPLE, IRCBOT, KLEZ,
LORING, MEMERY, PICSYS, SIMBOT, SYTRO, URELAS, and
VTFLOODER. In total we evaluate on 7,793 malware samples.
The largest number of family samples is 4,000 for ALLAPLE
and the smallest 113 for MEMERY.
A. Unpacking and Disassembly
Table III details the unpacking and disassembly results
for the 10 malware families. For each family, it shows: the
number of executables analyzed; the number of instructions
(in millions) traced for all malware processes; the number
of malware processes traced; the number of waves for all
malware processes; the unpacking runtime (in seconds); the
total number of unpacked functions in the IDA databases
(including short and external functions that IDA counts); and
the disassembly runtime (in seconds).
For 6 families all samples have a single process, for
LORING all samples have 2 processes, and the remaining three
(i.e., IRCBOT, SIMBOT, URELAS) have samples with different
number of processes. The number of waves ranges from 1 (i.e.,
13,66 335,17 618,273 618,811
22,111
618,76
13 215 609
22
615
Fig. 6: Lineage graph for SYTRO built using 1,354 samples.
The node label indicates the number of functions in the version
and the number of samples of that version. The edge label is
the number of shared functions.
not packed) up to 215 for a URELAS sample. Surprisingly, 7
families have a few samples that are not packed (e.g., 5 out of
131 samples in PICSYS), which may be due to the developers
forgetting to pack some samples or to early versions not being
packed. On average, replaying a recording takes 11 minutes,
the slowest being VTFLOODER with an average of 32 minutes
per recording. The disassembly runtime takes on average 103
seconds per sample, of which 82% is due to the ByteWeight
function identification.
B. Lineage Inference
Table IV details the final lineage graphs output for the 10
malware families. The table shows the number of executables
for each family and for each hash: the number of nodes and
edges, the maximum number of samples in a version, the
number of singleton versions representing only one sample,
the maximum and minimum number of functions in a version,
and the total number of functions across all versions.
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|V | |E| max(|L(vi)|) |L(vi) = 1| max(|F (vi)|) min(|F (vi)|) |⋃F (vi)|
Family EXE spp raw spp raw spp raw spp raw spp raw spp raw spp raw
Allaple 4,000 6 311 5 310 2,742 2,742 0 278 12 301 11 10 2,387 5,847
IRCbot 365 11 12 4 5 338 338 8 9 510 545 2 2 700 980
Klez 750 64 66 63 68 585 585 47 49 619 667 5 5 691 1,114
Loring 216 2 3 1 2 215 127 1 1 510 545 60 61 521 726
Memery 113 9 9 8 8 65 65 3 3 121 123 120 122 130 134
Picsys 131 3 4 2 3 95 95 0 1 379 473 16 16 387 736
Simbot 214 37 110 36 109 65 48 23 94 67 72 17 17 126 1,989
Sytro 1,354 6 7 5 4 811 811 0 0 618 667 13 13 758 1,509
Urelas 206 123 130 213 179 22 22 105 115 3,702 4,420 42 44 7,725 78,408
VtFlooder 444 32 95 39 95 228 228 16 82 905 945 10 10 5,324 9,397
TABLE IV: Lineage graph details. For each hash, it details the number of versions, edges, the maximum number of samples in
a version, the number of singleton versions representing a single sample, the maximum and minimum number of functions in a
version, and the total number of functions across all versions.
We focus on the SPP-NOP hash results as Section VIII-C
demonstrates that it outperforms the raw hash. The largest
number of SPP-NOP versions is for URELAS with 123 and
the smallest for LORING with 2. For 9 families, the number
of versions using both hashes differs. Overall, we identify 293
SPP-NOP versions across the 10 families, compared to 7,793
input samples, a 26 times reduction (10x reduction for the raw
hash). Thus, our lineage graph is a succinct summary of family
evolution, achieving over an order of magnitude reduction in
nodes compared to prior approaches where each input sample
is a node.
The results show that some versions are more popular than
others in terms of samples. For example, 99% of LORING
and 92% of IRCBOT samples are derived from one version.
On the other hand, 51% of URELAS samples correspond to
singleton versions, which may be due to a large amount of
experimentation in the family, or to limited coverage of our
input samples for some versions. The code of a family can
significantly evolve over time. For example URELAS versions
range from 42 up to 4,420 functions. We also observe different
code base sizes across families. The most complicated malware
families are URELAS and VTFLOODER with 7.7K and 5.3K
functions across all versions, respectively. The simplest mal-
ware family is SIMBOT with a total of 126 functions in 216
samples.
Of the 10 malware families, 3 have straight-line devel-
opment (ALLAPLE, LORING, PICSYS). Figure 1 shows the
final PICSYS lineage graph. MEMERY and SYTRO have mostly
straight development with only one node having two branches,
one of them leading to a single node, as illustrated in the lin-
eage graph for SYTRO in Figure 6. SIMBOT has mostly straight
development with 4 nodes having two branches. IRCBOT has
multiple straight lines, although 98% of the input samples be-
long to the same line. Finally, the lineage graphs of 3 families
(KLEZ, URELAS, VTFLOODER) are DAGs. These results show
the variety of development models malware families may use
and the difficulty of predicting the development model apriori.
To conclude the results show that the lineage graph is a
succinct summary of the evolution of a malware family, which
reduces the number of input samples to a much smaller (i.e., 26
times smaller) number of versions. The 10 malware families
show varying development models that are captured by our
lineage inference algorithm.
X. DISCUSSION
This section discusses some limitations of our work and
directions for future investigation.
Packers that modify the original code. Our unpacking
module handles packers where the original code is recovered
at runtime. However, packers may transform the original code,
so that it is no longer present in the packed executable. For
example, virtualization-based packers such as Themida and
VMProtect convert assembly into bytecode interpreted by a
VM. One approach to handle such packers is analyzing the
executable code output by the interpreter. We leave the support
of such packers as future work.
Evasion. Similar to other dynamic analysis approaches, our
unpacking can be evaded by techniques that detect the pres-
ence of a VM or emulator. We ameliorate this problem by
incorporating countermeasures for specific anti-VM checks,
but our countermeasures are not complete. Interestingly, we
observe that anti-VM checks are typically packed themselves
to avoid their presence flagging the executable as malware.
If the anti-VM checks are unpacked simultaneously with the
original code, by the time the malware executes the anti-VM
checks our unpacking has already captured the original code
in a differential memory snapshot.
Code semantics. Our approach enables comparing the func-
tions added and removed across versions of a malware family.
However, the analyst still needs to examine the added and
removed functions to understand their functionality. In future
work, we plan to provide the analyst with summaries of the
semantics of those functions to further reduce the malware
analysis effort.
Function identification. Most disassembly errors in our eval-
uation are due to missed functions. Our system currently
uses ByteWeight [5] for function identification, but could use
other tools. We are currently evaluating Nucleus [2], which
should improve on ByteWeight results, but have not finished
integrating it into our toolchain yet.
XI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel malware lineage approach that
works on malware collected in the wild. Given a pool of
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malware executables from the same family, it produces a
lineage graph where nodes are family versions and edges
describe their descendant relationships. We have proposed the
first technique to identify different versions of a malware
family and a scalable code indexing technique for efficiently
identifying functions shared between any pair of versions. We
have evaluated the accuracy of our approach on 13 benign
programs and produced lineage graphs for 10 malware fami-
lies, showing that the produced lineage graphs are a succinct
representation of the evolution of a malware family.
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APPENDIX
A. Complexity Analysis
Let the set of malware samples be S = {s1, · · · , sn} and
F be the set of functions appearing in all malware samples
in S. Let F : S → 2F label each malware with the set of
functions appearing in it (e.g., F (s2) = {f5, f8} means that
functions f5 and f8 appear in s2). Our algorithm is divided
into three phases.
Phase I (clustering): The goal of this phase is to find a
coarsest partition P = {G1, G2, · · · , Gk} of S such that
si and sj are in the same group iff F (si) = F (sj). Using
hashing, the cost of finding this partition is O(n). We overload
the function F , and use F (Gi) to be F (s) for some s ∈ Gi
(since all s ∈ G(si) have the same label F (s), picking an
arbitrary s does not create an issue.)
Phase II (Lineage Tree): This tree T = (V,E) has k vertices
{1, · · · , k}, where vertex i corresponds to group Gi. Let
inst(si, sj) be the number of instructions common between
si and sj . We say that Gi ≺ Gj iff F (i) ⊂ F (j). For
each j ∈ V , define dist(i, j) (for i ∈ V ) to be the 2-tuple
〈|F (Gi)∪F (Gj)|, inst(si, sj)〉. We say that 〈n,m〉 < 〈n′,m′〉
iff n < n′ or (n = n′ ∧ m < m′) (i.e., we use lexico-
graphical ordering on the 2-tuple). Let MIN(j) ⊆ V − {j}
be all the minimal elements according to the metric dist (i.e.,
i ∈ MIN(j) iff there does no exist a k ∈ V − {j} such that
dist(k, j) < dist(i, j)). We add an edge (i, j) ∈ E where i
is the highest index in the set MIN(j). Assuming that all the
metrics have been pre-computed, computing edges in E takes
at most O(k2) time.
Phase III (Adding cross-edges): Next we add cross-edges to
the tree T = (V,E) constructed in phase II. Le the set of
cross-edges Ec ⊆ V × V . Let FT : V → F be a such that
FT (i) is F (i) minus the labels of the parent of i and children
of i (if the parent or children of i don’t exist, then we do
subtract anything from F (i)). For each j ∈ V , let Z(j) be all
i ∈ V that satisfy the following conditions: i 6= j and i is
not the parent or child of j in the lineage tree T . We want to
find a set of indices of minimal size I(j) ⊆ Z(j), such that
FT (j) ⊆
⋃
i∈I(j) F (i) (in other words we want to find the
minimal cover for the set Ft(j) using sets whose indices are
in Z(j). Finding the minimal cover is NP-hard, so we rely on
iterative algorithm to “approximate” I(j). We add I(j)× {j}
to the set of cross-edges Ec. Our iterative algorithm to pick
I(j) takes time O(k) for each j. Therefore, the entire running
time of this phase is O(k2).
15
